Bail, Sentencing, and the Presumption of Innocence: What Bill C-14 Means
The Federal Government introduced Bill C-14 on October 23, 2025, titled “An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the National Defence Act (bail and sentencing)”. This proposed legislation includes over 80 changes to the criminal justice system. In this blog, two of the topics proposed for reform will be discussed:
- Stricter bail laws; and
- Tougher sentencing laws.
Both reforms are presented as part of a “tough on crime” agenda aimed at violent offences, repeat offenders, and organized crime. If passed, the bill would have sweeping implications for anyone charged with a “violent” or “serious” offence. Under s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code, a “serious offence” is defined as an indictable offence punishable by a maximum prison term of five years or more, or another offence prescribed by regulation.
The Proposed Bail Reforms
Canadian criminal law has long recognized the “principle of restraint,” which means that an accused person ought to be released at the earliest opportunity, and that bail conditions imposed on an accused person should be no more than reasonably necessary. Linked to this is the ladder principle, which instructs courts to begin with the least restrictive form of release and only escalate bail conditions when justified.
The proposed amendments would require the Courts and police to be directed on how to apply the new “principle of restraint”, meaning that the principle does not mandate release. Additionally, an accused should not be released if detention is justified. The amendments also propose to clarify that the ladder principle does not apply to accused persons who are subject to a “reverse onus” bail, and that the Courts must consider whether the allegations involve random or unprovoked violence when deciding on an accused’s bail.
Generally, when the Crown seeks to detain an accused person pending a criminal trial, the Crown has the “onus” to prove that the accused’s detention is required. However, certain offences have a presumption that an accused will not be released, based on the nature of the charges. This principle is called the “reverse onus”, under which an accused, not the Crown, must prove that their release is justified. Examples of these types of offences include indictable offences committed while the accused was already on release for an earlier indictable offence; offences committed in the context of a criminal organization; terrorism offences; offences involving firearms; aggravated sexual assault; and offences where the accused is not ordinarily a resident of Canada. The proposed amendments of the bill would seek to increase the umbrella for reverse onus offences to include: violent or organized crime-related auto theft; breaking and entering; trafficking in persons; human smuggling; assault or sexual assault involving choking, suffocation or strangulation; extortion involving violence.
A current condition that should be considered in reverse-onus bail cases is whether an accused was convicted of an offence involving violence or threats within the last 5 years. The amendment seeks to increase this to 10 years instead of 5. Another proposed amendment is that, if an accused person is found guilty during the criminal justice process, a new reverse onus would be placed on convicted persons if the Crown sought to revoke bail pending their sentencing. Lastly, in reverse onus cases, the amendment requires Courts to closely scrutinize the accused’s bail plan to ensure it is reliable and credible in addressing any risks associated with the accused’s release. The Courts already analyzed bail plans, so it is unclear why Parliament is adding this into the Code, except to show that they are being more “tough” on crime.
Proposed Sentencing Reforms
On the sentencing front, Bill C-14 proposes to increase the punishment for convicted offenders. Of particular note is the restriction of the availability of Conditional Sentence Orders (CSOs, commonly referred to as “house arrest”) for certain sexual offences. A CSO allows offenders to serve a sentence of less than two years in the community under strict conditions. This option is available when the court is satisfied that public safety will not be jeopardized and the sentence is consistent with the purposes of sentencing under section 718 of the Criminal Code.
The new legislation would make CSOs unavailable for certain sexual offences. The bill also introduces mandatory consecutive sentences for repeat violent offenders (e.g., violent auto theft, break-and-enter, extortion and arson) and new aggravating factors (e.g., crimes against first responders, retail theft, harms to infrastructure).
Issues with the proposed bail reforms
At paragraphs 47 and 48 in R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64, the Honourable Justice Iacobucci addressed the concerns of bail, stating:
“At the heart of a free and democratic society is the liberty of its subjects. Liberty lost is never regained and can never be fully compensated for; therefore, where the potential exists for the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society, must place the highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an unwarranted denial of liberty.
In the context of the criminal law, this fundamental freedom is embodied generally in the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and further in the specific right to bail. When bail is denied to an individual who is merely accused of a criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is necessarily infringed…”.
While many people may cheer and applaud the government for stricter bail conditions involving more serious allegations, it is essential to remember that those who are denied bail and held in custody until their trial are not guilty of their crimes. They are instead accused of crimes. In this light, two primary concerns arise with the proposed bail reforms.
First, by lowering the threshold for detention via expanded reverse onus and a reduction of the ladder principle, there is a risk of over-detention of the innocent. This is the very thing the presumption of innocence seeks to avoid, which is a recognized right for all citizens under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Honourable Justice Charron wrote in Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, that a long-standing cornerstone of our justice system is the recognition that it is better for ten guilty persons to escape than one innocent person being incarcerated. Further, when safeguards fail and an innocent person is sent to jail, it is undeniable that justice has failed “in the most fundamental sense”. The proposed bail reforms shift the burden onto a person accused of a crime, fundamentally compromising their right to be innocent until proven guilty.
Second, the reforms propose broader categories of detention without necessarily providing evidence of increased risk should the accused person be released pending a trial. There is a risk of detaining individuals who do not pose a risk, thereby increasing remand populations and imposing significant costs. These costs increase an accused’s financial burden to mount a proper defence and to argue why they should receive bail, as well as taxpayers who must now bear the cost to house additional accused persons when their detention may be unnecessary. The accused person also pays an intangible mental cost, as it is clear that being held in a confined space, with their most fundamental right to liberty infringed, can create significant issues for the person upon leaving detention.
As the Supreme Court has recognized in the previously quoted cases, the State’s ability to hold a person infringes upon the most vital of recognized rights, that of liberty. It is only in the clearest and most egregious of circumstances that a person should be denied bail before enacting their constitutionally protected right to a trial. The proposed bail reforms allow the State to more easily infringe on any person’s right to be innocent until proven guilty, and their section 11(e) Charter rights to not be denied reasonable bail without just cause.
Issues with removing CSO sentences for sexual-offence convictions
The proposed sentencing reforms are intended to increase the jeopardy faced by an accused person. Of note is that parliament wants to restrict the ability of persons convicted for offences of a sexual nature to obtain a “conditional sentence order” or “CSO” as a sentence.
Bill C-14 would make CSOs unavailable for many sexual offences. While intended to signal denunciation and deterrence, this categorical exclusion raises concerns, including:
- Reduced flexibility and recognition of personal circumstances. Removing CSOs limits judicial discretion to tailor sentences to the offender’s risk, rehabilitation prospects, and proportionality.
- CSOs allow for structured supervision and counselling. Removing them may hinder rehabilitation and reintegration.
- A blanket prohibition treats all sexual-offence convictions alike, ignoring the severity and moral blameworthiness of each case, thereby directly impacting issues of proportionality.
- Increased custodial sentences could strain correctional resources without demonstrably improving public safety, resulting in a systemic impact. This could lead to increased overpopulation and significant delays in a person’s right to a bail hearing within a reasonable time. These are issues that already plague the criminal justice system and could be exacerbated if Bill C-14 is passed into law.
This proposed reform effectively prioritizes uniform punishment over individualized justice and is at odds with the principle of proportionality highlighted in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code.
Issues of consecutive sentencing and aggravating factors
This shift is significant. Canadian courts traditionally exercise discretion to impose concurrent sentences when offences arise from the same “transaction” or are part of a single criminal episode. Concurrent sentences allow an offender to serve multiple prison sentences at the same time because they arose from the same incident. Mandatory consecutive sentences remove that discretion, increasing total time in custody even when offences are closely connected. This approach poses issues because it:
- Erodes proportionality by punishing a single criminal incident as though it were multiple distinct acts;
- Undermines rehabilitation, since lengthy cumulative sentences can reduce the prospect of reintegration; and
- Exacerbates prison overcrowding without any clear deterrent benefit.
Bill C-14 also introduces new aggravating factors, including crimes against first responders, retail workers, and critical infrastructure. While acknowledging the vulnerability of these groups is important, imposing statutory requirements for aggravating factors that Courts must consider risks over-penalizing contextually minor conduct.
Ultimately, both the consecutive sentencing and new aggravating-factor provisions reflect a shift away from individualized justice toward blanket, categorical punishment. While politically attractive on its face, in practice, this approach reduces niche sentencing based on individual circumstances, further exacerbating systemic issues already plaguing the criminal justice system.
Conclusion
Bill C-14 represents one of the most significant changes to constitutionally protected individual rights under the Charter in recent years. Stricter bail requirements and harsher sentences may create a perception of “toughness” among Parliament, but in reality, they undermine long-standing principles such as the presumption of innocence, proportionality, rehabilitation, and individualized justice. It highlights the two most prominent historical tensions in criminal law: governments enacting policies to appear “tough on crime” versus practical issues such as reductions in safeguards for individual liberty, the presumption of innocence, recognition of personal circumstances, and systemic problems that follow such policy decisions.
